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BASIC INC. v. LEVINSON
Over the past two decades, the fraud-on-the-market theory
("FMT") has become a powerful tool for plaintiffs in securities fraud
actions.' Traditionally, to successfully maintain a securities fraud
claim under Rule lOb-5,2 promulgated under section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act"), 3 a plaintiff had to
1 Commentators claim that the theory evolved as courts relaxed the individual
subjective reliance requirement and began to favor an objective measure of materiality.
See Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969);
Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (the
second circuit examined the defendant's impact on the generalized impersonal market
in finding a violation of Rule 1Ob-5); In re Memorex Security Cases, 61 F.R.D. 88 (N.D.
Cal. 1973). The Supreme Court stimulated further development of the theory in Affili-
ated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), and Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), by focusing on the objective materiality requirement. Finally,
after Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976),
courts generally adopted the phrase "fraud-on-the-market." For extensive discussion of
the development of the theory, see generally Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of
Dispensing with Reliance Requirements in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C.L. REV. 435
(1984); Rapp, Rule lOb-5 and "Fraud-on-the-Market"--Heavy Seas Meet Tranquil Shores, 39
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 861 (1982) Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 95 HARV. L. REV.
1143 (1982) [hereinafter Note, FMT]; Note, Fraud on the Market. An Emerging Theory of
Recovery Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 627 (1982) (authored by Michael
A. Lynn) [hereinafter Note, An Emerging Theory].
2 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988). The Rule states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mislead-
ing, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
The author notes the importance of distinguishing the three alternative routes to
recovery under Rule 10b-5. They are referred to as Route A, Route B, and Route C,
respectively. See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
3 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1982). The statute provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not
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establish: "(1) a misstatement or omission, (2) of a material fact, (3)
made with scienter, (4) on which the plaintiff reasonably relied, (5)
that proximately caused his injury." 4 Under this analysis, an inves-
tor bringing a securities fraud claim needed to establish that the
fraudulent misrepresentation or omission played a substantial role
in his investment decision.5 The FMT serves to establish the plain-
tiff's reliance requirement. 6 It provides the plaintiff with a rebutta-
ble presumption of reliance on the integrity of the market.7 To
overcome the presumption, a defendant must sever "the link be-
tween the alleged misrepresentation" and the plaintiff's injury.8
A plurality of the United States Supreme Court recently en-
dorsed the FMT in Basic Inc. v. Levinson.9 The Court, however,
leaves both the corporate attorney and the market investor unsure
of the theory's scope of application. A comparison of Basic to Shores
v. Sklar,'0 a 1981 fifth circuit decision, illustrates fundamental ques-
tions which Basic left unanswered. In forming answers to such ques-
tions, this Note will delineate the FMT's proper domain.
Part I summarizes and compares the facts of the two cases and
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in con-
travention of such rules and regulations as the commission may prescribe
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
4 Ross v. Bank South, N.A., 837 F.2d 980, 991 (11 th Cir.), reh'g granted, 848 F.2d
1132 (11th Cir. 1988); see Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 543 (5th
Cir. 1981), aff'd in part,, 459 U.S. 375 (1983); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1014 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977); Black, supra note 1, at 435 n.2.
5 See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. List
v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
6 As discussed infra, text accompanying notes 102 and 133-48, courts apply the
FMT inconsistently. Yet, whenever courts use the theory, it eases the plaintiff's burden
of proving reliance.
7 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 992 (1988).
8 Id.
9 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988). Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens com-
prised the plurality. Justices White and O'Connor dissented regarding the FMT. Chief
Justice Rehnquist andJustices Scalia and Kennedy did not take part in the decision. The
Supreme Court's endorsement followed the circuits' widespread adoption. See Peil v.
Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom. Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti
Corp, 108 S. Ct. 1220 (1988); Levinson v. Basic, Inc., 786 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1986), aff'd,
108 S. Ct. 978 (1988); Harris v. Union Elec., 787 F.2d 355 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
823 (1986); Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740 (1 1th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1132 (1985); TJ. Raney & Sons v. Fort Cobb, Okla. Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d
1330 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Linde, Thompson, Fairchild, Longsworthy,
Kohn & VanDyke v. TJ. Raney & Sons, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d
462 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983); Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365 (2d
Cir. 1981), vacated, 459 U.S. 1027 (1982); Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545 (2d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
10 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983). The Shores litiga-
tion is ongoing. See Shores v. Sklar, 844 F.2d 1485 (11th Cir. 1988). This subsequent
litigation is immaterial to this Note.
9651989]
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
the routes to recovery under Rule lOb-5 that each case used. Part II
analyzes the efficient market hypothesis, which underlies the FMT
endorsed by a plurality of the Supreme Court in Basic. Part III ana-
lyzes the application of the FMT in Shores. Criticism of Shores em-
phasizes the fifth circuit's narrow justification for applying the FMT
in an inefficient market setting. Part III also concludes that the
Shores version of the FMT is inconsistent with Basic, which limits the
FMT to efficient markets. Shores did not undertake, as Basic implic-
itly required, an analysis of the subject security market. Part IV




A. Basic Inc. v. Levinson
Basic Inc. ("Basic") and Combustion Engineering, Inc. ("Com-
bustion") merged after Basic publicly announced its approval of
Combustion's tender offer on December 20th, 1978.11 As early as
1965, Combustion had expressed interest in Basic, 12 and in 1976
representatives of both companies first met to consider a merger. 13
During the next two years, heavy trading in Basic stock caused Basic
to make public statements to explain the increased level of market
activity. In three public statements Basic flatly denied conducting
any merger negotiations, and stated that it could not account for the
abnormally heavy trading of its stock. 14 Basic made the third state-
11 108 S. Ct. 978, 981 (1988).
12 Id. at 980.
13 Id. at 981.
14 Id. In recounting the disclosures, the Court stated:
On October 21, 1977, after heavy trading and a new high in Basic
stock, the following news item appeared in the Cleveland Plain Dealer:
"[Basic] President Max Muller said the company knew no reason for
the stock's activity and that no negotiations were under way with any
company for a merger. He said Flintkote recently denied Wall Street ru-
mors that it would make a tender offer of $25 a share for control of the
Cleveland-based maker of refractories for the steel industry."
On September 25, 1978, in reply to an inquiry from the New York
Stock Exchange, Basic issued a release concerning increased activity in its
stock and stated that
"management is unaware of any present or pending company devel-
opment that would result in the abnormally heavy trading activity and
price fluctuation in company shares that have been experienced in the
past few days."
On November 6, 1978, Basic issued to its shareholders a "Nine
Months Report 1978." This Report stated:
"With regard to the stock market activity in the Company's shares we
remain unaware of any present or pending developments which would
account for the high volume of trading and price fluctuations in recent
months."
[Vol. 74:964966
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ment in November of 1978, the month before the merger. 15 Basic
denied any corporate developments through Friday, December
15,16 but in light of Combustion's imminent tender offer, Basic
asked the New York Stock Exchange to suspend trading of its stock
on Monday, December 18.17
Max Levinson, along with two other Basic shareholders,
brought a class action against Basic and its directors, alleging viola-
tions of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and of Rule lOb-5.18 The
class' 9 included all "shareholders who sold their stock after Basic's
first public statement ... and before the suspension of trading in
December 1978."20 The plaintiffs alleged that Basic's misrepresen-
tations caused them to sell their shares at artificially depressed
prices. 21 The district court certified the plaintiff class.22 It adopted
Id. at 981 n.4.
15 Id. at 981.
16 Levinson v. Basic, Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 745 (6th Cir. 1986), aft'd, 108 S. Ct. 978
(1988). The sixth circuit's opinion describes in detail the actual extent of merger negoti-
ations. In light of the record, Basic's denials constituted outright misrepresentations.
17 Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 981. Exchange suspensions are common, and often occur
following a news announcement which the exchange believes will significantly affect a
stock's price. Likewise, it is not uncommon for a public company to request a suspen-
sion. L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 445 (2d ed. 1988).
18 Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 981.
19 With the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the Supreme Court increased the availability of the class action as a litigation tool. The
importance of the class action to securities litigation is undisputed. See Black, supra note
1, at 439-41.
20 Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 981. Courts have accepted the fraud-on-the-market theory as
predominantly a class action weapon. This Note does not question this characterization.
See Levinson v. Basic, Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 749-50 (6th Cir. 1986). In short, "[t]he theory
has revolutionized securities fraud litigation." Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, The Crash,
and the Fraud on the Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907 (1989) [hereinafter Fischel,
Efficient Capital Markets).
21 Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 981. The relationship between the misrepresentations and
the depressed prices is straightforward. Mergers and takeovers benefit shareholders by
allowing substantial profits through the tender offer process. Thus, the rational share-
holder, with knowledge of an imminent takeover, would realize the premium value of his
shares. If the company, however, fraudulently withholds such information from the
shareholders, the market will not reflect the security's premium value, and the fraud will
artificially depress the security's price. The fraud injures the sellers of the security who
sell before the target company openly announces the takeover.
Likewise, fraudulent statements or omissions may artificially inflate a security's
price. Then, the fraud injures investors who purchase [securities] in reliance on the
integrity of the market price. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, supra note 20, at 909. For
example, if a company fraudulently disclosed that it was involved in merger negotia-
tions, the disclosure would injure subsequent buyers of the stock, because the fraudu-
lent statement would artificially 'inflate the stock's price. If the sham merger
negotiations were uncovered, the stock's price would fall, as would the value of the
buyer's investment.
22 Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 981. The district court applied a presumption of reliance in
certifying the plaintiff class. The presumption, a direct application of fraud-on-the-mar-
ket theory, allowed the court to conclude that "questions of law or fact common to the
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a presumption that members of the class relied on Basic's public
statements. 23 The presumption was vital to the class certification
because it "enabled the court to conclude that common questions of
fact or law predominated over particular questions pertaining to in-
dividual plaintiffs." 24 The district court, however, granted summary
judgment for Basic. 25 The sixth circuit reversed on appeal. 26 The
court of appeals upheld the district court's class certification, and
explicitly endorsed the fraud-on-the-market theory. 27
B. Shores v. Sklar
Unlike the stock in Basic, the securities at issue in Shores v.
Sklar 28 did not trade on a national securities market.29 Rather,
Shores involved the issuance of industrial revenue bonds, which do
not require registration under the Securities Act of 1933.30 The
bonds were sold in an undeveloped market. 31
J.C. Harrelson, a majority shareholder of Alabama Supply and
Equipment Company ("ASECo"), along with an independent Ten-
nessee underwriter,32 sought financing to construct an industrial fa-
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual [plain-
tiffs.]" FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
23 Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 981. Common questions of fact or law are vital to class certifi-
cation. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
24 Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 981 (citation omitted). That fraud affects the class as a whole
is consistent with the notion that the fraud affects the entire market. "The fraud on the
market theory ... has shifted the focus from the individual plaintiff to whether a chal-
lenged disclosure affected the market as a whole." Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, supra
note 20, at 907.
25 Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 982.
26 Levinson v. Basic, Inc. 786 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1986), aft'd, 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988).
27 Id.
28 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983).
29 Basic's stock traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 981
n.4.
30 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1982). Section 77c(a)(2) exempts municipal bonds from
securities registration requirements. The Town of Frisco City, a municipality, issued the
subject industrial revenue bonds. Registration statements are an obvious source of pub-
lic information, information that the efficient market will reflect. See infra notes 49-60
and accompanying text.
31 See Ross v. Bank South, N.A., 837 F.2d 980, 993 (11 th Cir.) (citing Shores, the
court stated, "[t]he second . . . type of [FMT] cases involving fraud in the issuance of
securities traded on an undeveloped . . . market."), reh'g granted, 848 F.2d 1132 (11th
Cir. 1988); Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti Corp., 817 F.2d 356, 364 (5th Cir. 1987) ("[lIt is
clear that the market for the bonds in Shores does not represent the active, efficient mar-
ket for which the [FMT] was initially conceived."), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1220 (1988);
Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1162 (3rd Cir. 1986) ("Sklar, however, involved a newly
issued security rather than a security already being traded in a well-developed market."),
cert. denied sub nom. Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti Corp, 108 S. Ct. 1220 (1988); Lipton v.
Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 746 (11th Cir. 1984) ("The Shores opinion has been
criticized primarily because it extended fraud on the market to new issues in an undevel-
oped market.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985).
32 The Securities Act of 1933 defines "underwriter," in relevant part, as "any per-
968 [Vol. 74:964
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cility in Frisco City, Alabama.33 ASECo successfully persuaded the
Town of Frisco City to establish an Industrial Development Board.
By Alabama statute, the Board had the power to issue tax-exempt
bonds, use the proceeds to build an industrial facility, and then lease
the building.3 4 The municipality, however, would not guarantee the
bonds. Rather, revenues from the lease would secure the debt.35
Thus, the financial soundness of the facility was of utmost impor-
tance "in evaluating the worth of the bonds." 36
Defendant Sklar acted as counsel for the issuance of the bonds.
ASECo and the underwriter provided Sklar with information, and
Sklar drafted an offering circular 37 to promote the bonds' sales.
Sklar, however, intentionally or recklessly omitted relevant facts
concerning the financial soundness and propriety of his clients.38
The original underwriter assigned its underwriting rights to
Jackson Municipals, Inc. ("JMI"). JMI was fully aware of the fraud
contained in the offering circular, but failed to investigate the
wrongdoing.3 9 In December 1972, JMI began selling the bonds to
securities dealers. 40
Plaintiff Bishop spoke with his securities broker in January 1973
and, upon the broker's advice, purchased three bonds.4 1 Bishop
was not aware of the offering circular and admitted that he never
read it.42 After AESCo defaulted on the bonds,43 Bishop brought a
class action against defendants for securities fraud in violation of
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule lOb-5. 44 The district court
son who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in
connection with, the distribution of any security or participates or has a direct or indirect
participation in any such undertaking .... 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1 1). For a general discus-
sion of the term, see L. Loss, supra note 17, at 252-68.
33 Shores, 647 F.2d at 465.
34 Id. See ALA. CODE §§ 11-54-80-11-54-101 (1985).
35 Shores, 647 F.2d at 465. Upon completion of the facility, the builder leases it, and
the rental payments are the "sole source for the satisfaction of interest obligations and
repayment of principal." Id.
36 Rapp, supra note 1, at 881.
37 An offering circular is similar to a prospectus. An offeror must file one with the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and distribute copies with any securities
offerings. SEC rules and regulations govern its content.
38 Shores, 647 F.2d at 465. For example, the circular failed to state that the SEC had
previously commenced a civil action against the underwriters on unrelated matters.
Sklar also portrayed AESCo as a successful and experienced contractor, and grossly mis-
stated AESCo's real estate holdings. Sklar also knowingly included a materially false
financial statement in the circular. Id. at 466.
39 Id. JMI was also a defendant in securities litigation with the original
underwriters.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 467.
42 Id. at 468.
43 AESCo defaulted in April 1974. Id. at 467.
44 The plaintiff also sought relief under the Securities Act of 1933 and an unspeci-
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held that, as Bishop admittedly never read the offering circular
when he originally purchased the bonds, he could not recover be-
cause "his lack of reliance [on the circular] was fatal to his claim."'4 5
On appeal, the fifth circuit reversed, holding that Bishop had a via-
ble claim under Rule 1Ob-5. 46 Specifically, the court of appeals held
that summary judgment was improper because Bishop's pleadings
would support a finding of a "deliberate, manipulative scheme[] to
defraud .... ,47
C. Factual Comparison
Basic and Shores illustrate application of the FMT to dissimilar
fact patterns. Market efficiency is the crucial distinction between Ba-
sic and Shores. Efficiency "means that the market price of a security
represents the market's consensus estimate of the value of that se-
curity." 48 In an efficient market, a security's price will reflect all
public information regarding the economy, financial markets, and
the actual issuing company.49 Basic involved shares of stock traded
on arguably the most efficient impersonal securities market-the
New York Stock Exchange. 50 By contrast, the securities at issue in
Shores traded on an undeveloped, inefficient market.
Basic's stock traded actively among investors on an efficient sec-
ondary market 5' before the plaintiffs purchased their stock or ulti-
mately sold it at artificially depressed prices.52 Because the New
York Stock Exchange, the largest organized exchange in the United
fled Alabama statute. The trial court dismissed these claims, and the plaintiff did not
appeal the dismissals. Id.
45 Id. at 464.
46 Id. at 469.
47 Id. at 464.
48 J. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 55 (7th ed. 1986); seeJ. FRAN-
CIS & S. ARCHER, PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS 193 (1971); B. MALKIEL, THE INFLATION BEATER'S
INVESTMENT GUIDE: WINNING STRATEGIES FOR THE 1980's 64 (1980); R. IBBOTSON & G.
BRINSON, INVESTMENT MARKETS 45 (1987);J. WOOD & N. WOOD, FINANCIAL MARKETS 1I
(1985); Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively
Traded Securities, 38 Bus. LAw 1, 4 (Nov. 1982) [hereinafter Fischel, Finance Theory].
49 J. VAN HORNE, supra note 48, at 55. See also R. IBBOTSON & G. BRINSON, supra note
48, at 47 ("The efficient markets hypothesis states that the price of an asset reflects all
available information.").
50 J. VAN HORNE, supra note 48, at 56; R. IBBOTSON & G. BRINSON, supra note 48, at
47.
51 On the New York Stock Exchange, investors typically trade, via their brokers,
among themselves. Once securities are traded in a primary market, see infra note 55 and
accompanying text, "they are then traded from investor to investor in the secondary mar-
ket. The role of the secondary market is to provide investors with liquidity for their
investments, enabling them to move quickly, and without substantial loss in market
value, from security to cash and from one security to another." R. HAUGEN, MODERN
INVESTMENT THEORY 22-23 (1986).
52 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 981 (1988).
970 [Vol. 74:964
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States and Canada, 53 is presumed to be efficient, trading prices re-
flect publicly disseminated information, information that may be, as
in Basic, fraudulent.5 4
In Shores, investors traded newly issued bonds55 in an undevel-
oped, inefficient market.56 The market lacked efficiency for two rea-
sons. First, Frisco City had no industrial revenue bond market
before the defendants' scheme.57 Second, the structure of the bond
market would not allow rapid response to new information 58 such as
that contained in the offering circular. Not enough market partici-
pants existed 59 to "drive price changes about a security's 'intrinsic'
value to a random walk."60 The market from which the plaintiff
53 R. HAUGEN, supra note 51, at 23.
54 See infra notes 58-61.
55 Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 466 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102
(1983). The court of appeals found that "[revenue] bonds from towns like Frisco City
are not ordinarily traded in a secondary market .... " Id. at 467. This supported the
district court's finding that the plaintiff purchased the bonds in the primary market di-
rectly from an underwriter. Id. "When securities are initially offered to the public, they
are said to be sold in the primary market." R. HAUGEN, supra note 51, at 22. In a primary
market, the underwriter, often an investment banking firm, is the middleman between
the issuing corporation and potential security buyer. Shores, 647 F.2d at 467. The un-
derwriter connects businesses with investors, the sources of capital. Id. This connection
is on a personal level, as compared to secondary market transactions which involve im-
personal transactions among investors. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, however,
could not conclusively determine whether the plaintiff purchased securities in a primary
market or from another investor in a secondary market. Id. As Part IV of this Note, infra
notes 164-88 and accompanying text, explains, however, the existence of a primary or
secondary market should not determine whether a court may apply the FMT.
56 See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
57 The defendants "induce[d] the Town of Frisco City to create an Industrial Devel-
opment Board to finance ASECo's facility .... 647 F.2d at 465. Given that the Board
did not exist prior to the defendants' scheme, and that such a board must authorize
municipal bonds, see ALA. CODE § 11-54-87 (1985), it follows that the defendant actually
created the market for the bonds. See also Ross v. Bank South, N.A., 837 F.2d 980, 995
(I 1 th Cir.) (in correctly concluding that a defendant can rebut the FMT presumption by
showing that "his fraud had no effect on the market price," the court stated, "A Shores
defendant can make no such showing ... because his fraud creates the bond itself.")
(emphasis in original), reh'g granted, 848 F.2d 1132 (11th Cir. 1988).
58 That the security's price rapidly adjusts to new information is essential to the
efficient market hypothesis. See infra note 61; J. VAN HORNE, supra note 48, at 55; R.
IBBOTSON & G. BRINSON, supra note 48, at 47; Fischel, Finance Theory, supra note 48, at 9;
see also Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383
(1970), reprinted in CAPITAL MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AND EFFICIENCY 41 (J. Bicksler ed.
1974) [hereinafter Fama, Efficient Capital Markets] ("[a] market in which prices always
'fully reflect' available information is called efficient").
59 Commentators agree that the efficient market theory requires that a sufficiently
large number of market participants "promptly receive and analyze all the information
that is publicly available concerning companies whose securities they follow." SeeJ. VAN
HORNE, supra note 48, at 56. See also, R. HAUGEN, supra note 51, at 467 (referring to an
"army" of well-informed security analysts and traders); Fama, Efficient Capital Markets,
supra note 58, at 388 ("the market may be efficient if 'sufficient numbers' of investors
have ready access to available information").
60 J. VAN HORNE, supra note 48, at 56. The random walk hypothesis asserts "that
1989]
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purchased the securities was not efficient. 61
Basic and Shores apply the FMT in markets with distinct charac-
teristics. Basic applies the FMT in an efficient market and Shores ap-
plies the FMT in an inefficient market. An examination of the
foundations of the FMT as applied in Basic reveals that courts
should use the FMT only in cases involving an efficient market
setting.
II
THE FMT AND BASIC INC. V. LEVINSON
A. FMT as a Presumption of Reliance
In Basic, the Supreme Court reinforced the traditional notion
one cannot use past security prices to predict future prices in such a way as to profit on
average." Id. Thus, while new information may cause a change in the value of a secur-
ity, "subsequent security price movements will follow.., a random walk .... Id. at 55-
56. Fama presents the random walk model in detail. See generally Fama, Efficient Capital
Markets, supra note 58. See also Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, 21 FIN. ANALY-
sisJ. 55 (Sept.-Oct. 1965), reprinted in R. POSNER & K. Scorr, ECONOMICS OF CORPORA-
TION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION 156 (1980) (general discussion of the random
walk model). Law review commentary on the fraud-on-the-market theory has incorpo-
rated the random walk model. See, e.g., Black, supra note 1, at 437-38; Note, An Emerging
Theory, supra note 1, at 647-49.
61 If a market is efficient, it should have the following characteristics:
1. Security prices should respond quickly and accurately to the re-
ceipt of new information that is relevant to valuation.
2. The change in security prices from one period to the next should
be random in the sense that the change in price that takes place today
should be unrelated to the change in price that occurred yesterday or any
other day in the past.
3. It should be impossible to discriminate between profitable.., and
unprofitable investments in a future period based on any of the character-
istics of these investments that can be known in the current period. It
should be impossible, for example, for us to construct a trading rule that
utilizes information available at time t that enables us to predict the most
profitable investments of t + 1.
4. If we separate investors who are knowledgeable from those who
are not, we should discover that we are unable to find a significant differ-
ence between the average investment performance of the two groups.
Moreover .... differences in performance between groups and within
groups should be due to chance, and not something systematic and per-
manent like differences in ability to find information not already reflected
in stock prices.
R. HAUGEN, supra note 51, at 475-76. Haugen analyzes each of these factors. Id. at 476-
82.
From this description of an efficient market, it follows that a "market is inefficient
with respect to a piece of information if securities prices do not reflect that information
and if an investor can earn excess returns by trading on the basis of that information."
K. GARBADE, SECURITIES MARKETS 237 (1982). Thus, when information disseminates
slowly and investors "take time in analyzing the information and reacting," characteris-
tics of an inefficient market exist, and "prices may deviate from [actual] values .. " R.
HAUGEN, supra note 51, at 466.
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that reliance is an essential element of a Rule 1Ob-5 action.62 "Reli-
ance provides the requisite causal connection between a defendant's
misrepresentation and a plaintiff's injury." 63 In Ross v. Bank South,
N.A. ,64 Judge Allgood succinctly explained the relationship between
reliance and causation: "Reliance . . . always revolves around the
issue of causation, i.e., proving that the damaged party was induced
to act by the defendant's conduct thereby establishing the causal
link between the defendant's misconduct and the plaintiff's decision
to buy or sell securities." 65
The Supreme Court first abrogated the plaintiff's burden of
proving direct reliance 66 in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,67
holding that the plaintiff could satisfy the reliance requirement by
establishing that the defendant made material omissions.68
Although Affiliated Ute did not expressly state that proof of material-
ity creates a presumption of reliance, courts, including the Supreme
Court in Basic, have relied on this case in creating such
presumptions. 69
62 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 989 (1988) (citing Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976)). See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
63 Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 989 (citing Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp.,
648 F.2d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 1981)); see also Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3rd Cir.
1986) (arguing that the "causal connection" under FMT is equivalent to direct reliance
causation), cert. denied sub nom. Finkel v, Docutel/Olivetti Corp, 108 S. Ct. 1220 (1988);
Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider & Co., 578 F.2d 713, 715 (8th Cir. 1978) (indicating that
"causal nexus" is required to limit a defendant's liability); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d
891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975) (concluding materiality of misrepresentation may establish nec-
essary causal link), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976); Note, The Reliance Requirement in Pri-
vate Actions under SEC Rule lOb-5, 88 HARv. L. REv. 584, 593 (1975) (arguing that,
although direct reliance is not necessary to establish causation in specific instances, reli-
ance by some market participants is ultimately required.).
64 837 F.2d 980 (11th Cir.), reh'g granted, 848 F.2d 1132 (11th Cir. 1988).
65 Id. at 1005 (Allgood, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
66 See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. List
v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965) (burden of proving direct reliance imposed on the
plaintiff).
67 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
68 Omissions involve the defendant's failure to disclose; misrepresentations involve
the defendant's false and misleading disclosures. The Court held that where the plain-
tiff bases his claim primarily on omissions,
positive proof is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary is
that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable investor
might have considered them important in the making of this decision....
This obligation to disclose and this withholding of a material fact estab-
lished the requisite element of causation in fact.
Id. at 153-54 (citations omitted). For commentary on the significance of the Affiliated Ute
decision, see Black, supra note 1, at 442-45, 447-49; Rapp, supra note 1, at 869-70; Note,
FMT, supra note 1, at 1145-46; Note, An Emerging Theory, supra note 1, at 634-35.
69 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 990 (1988); Lipton v. Documation,
Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 742-43 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985); Arthur
Young & Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 549 F.2d 686, 694 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
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Blackie v. Barrack 70 illustrates a lower court's first whole-hearted
application of the FMT reliance presumption to a misrepresentation
in an open market fraud context. The Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals stated, "We merely recognize that individual 'transactional
causation' can in these circumstances be inferred from the material-
ity of the misrepresentation, and shift to the defendant the burden
of disproving a prima facie case of causation." 71 Courts have con-
sistently regarded Blackie as an extension of the Affiliated Ute pre-
sumption to misrepresentation cases. 72
The ninth circuit reasoned in Blackie that even in a misrepresen-
tation case, the securities purchaser relies on the assumption that
the market price reflects the security's value. 73 By relying on the
security's price, a purchaser indirectly relies on any representations.
Yet, "whether he is aware of it or not, the price he pays reflects
material misrepresentations." 74 It is unsound to defeat recovery be-
cause reliance is indirect, for the "causational chain is broken only if
the purchaser would have purchased the stock even had he known of
the mispresentations." 75 Using this reasoning, the court concluded
that the presumption is appropriate because the requirement of
U.S. 829 (1977); Lubin v. Sybedon Corp., 688 F. Supp. 1425, 1446 (S.D. Cal. 1988); In re
LTV Securities Litigation, 88 F.R.D. 134, 142 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
70 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
71 Id. at 906 (citations omitted). "Transaction causation" and "loss causation"
have played an important role in many lower court decisions. See Harris v. Union Elec.
Co., 787 F.2d 355 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 823 (1986); Wilson v. Comtech Tele-
communications Corp., 648 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1981); Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean,
640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd in part, 459 U.S. 375 (1983); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie
Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975); Bastian v.
Petren Resources Corp., 682 F. Supp. 956 (N.D. Il1. 1988). For purposes of this Note,
[t]ransaction causation is established when the plaintiff shows that the de-
fendant's fraudulent conduct caused the plaintiff to engage in the transac-
tion in question. This is nothing more than "but for" causation, which is
merely another way of describing reliance. Loss causation, on the other
hand, is the nexus between the defendant's fraudulent conduct and the
plaintiff's pecuniary loss.
Harris, 787 F.2d at 366 (citations omitted).
The fraud-on-the-market theory, because it is directed toward the reliance require-
ment, applies directly to transaction causation. Thus, unless otherwise specified, when
this Note discusses causation, it refers only to transaction causation. Loss causation re-
mains an element of the 1 Ob-5 claim; a plaintiff still must establish damages. See Wilson,
648 F.2d at 92; Bastian, 682 F. Supp. at 957; see also Murray v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 682
F. Supp. 343 (M.D. Tenn. 1988) (fraud-on-the-market theory does not relieve the plain-
tiff of the obligation to plead and prove loss causation.).
72 See Lipton, 734 F.2d at 743; Rifkin v. Crow, 574 F.2d 256, 263 (5th Cir. 1978);
LTV Securities, 88 F.R.D. at 143 (citing Rijkin, 574 F.2d at 263). Cf. Kramas v. Security
Gas & Oil Inc., 672 F.2d 766, 769 n.2 (9th Cir.) (reserving extension of Affiliated Ute
presumption to misrepresentations), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1035 (1982).





showing direct reliance "imposes an unreasonable and irrelevant ev-
identiary burden." 76
B. FMT as Limited to Efficient Markets
The Supreme Court in Basic began its discussion of the fraud-
on-the-market theory by defining it:
The fraud-on-the-market theory is based on the hypothesis that,
in an open end developed securities market, the price of a company's
stock is determined by the available material information regard-
ing the company and its business .... Misleading statements will
therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do
not directly rely on the misstatements .... The causal connection
between the defendants' fraud and the plaintiff's purchase of
stock in such a case is no less significant than in a case of direct
reliance on misrepresentations. 77
Inherent in the Court's definition is the importance of an efficient,
impersonal securities market. The Court concluded that the FMT
presumption is "supported by common sense and probability. ' '7 8
Plaintiffs rely on the integrity of an efficient market to price securi-
ties accurately. 79
Justice Blackmun, writing for the plurality in Basic, found sup-
port for applying the FMT to modern security market transactions-
as distinguished from "face-to-face transactions contemplated by
76 Id.; see also Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub
nom. Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1220 (1988).
77 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 988-89 (1988) (quoting Peil, 806 F.2d at
1160-61 (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied)). It follows from the Court's definition
that "[t]he misstatements may affect the price of the stock, and thus defraud purchasers
who rely on the price as an indicator of the stock's value. By artificially inflating the
price of the stock, the misrepresentations defraud purchasers who rely on the price as an
indication of the stock's value." Peil, 806 F.2d at 1160.
78 Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 991. The discussion of the efficient market hypothesis and the
random walk model supports this conclusion. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying
text.
The court in Blackie made a similar argument in favor of the presumption of reli-
ance. It concluded that "the same causal nexus can be adequately established indirectly,
by proof of materiality coupled with the common sense that a stock purchaser does not
ordinarily seek to purchase a loss in the form of artificially inflated stock. Under those
circumstances we think it appropriate to eliminate the burden." 524 F.2d at 908. (cita-
tions omitted).
79 Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 991; see also In re LTV Securities Litigation, 88 F.R.D. 134,
141-46 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (indicating that reliance on the market is sufficient to establish
class status in a class action).
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early fraud cases" 8 0-in In re LTV Securities Litigation.8 1 Concluding
that the Rule lOb-5 reliance requirement must "encompass" mod-
ern changes in the securities market structure, Justice Blackmun de-
scribed the efficient market as an agent of the investor:
In face-to-face transactions, the inquiry into an investor's reliance
upon information is into the subjective pricing of that information
by that investor. With the presence of the market, the market is
interposed between seller and buyer and, ideally, transmits infor-
mation to the investor in the processed form of a market price.
Thus the market is performing a substantial part of the valuation
process performed by the investor in a face-to-face transaction.
The market is acting as the unpaid agent of the investor, inform-
ing him that given all the information available to it, the value of
the stock is worth the market price.8 2
The Court realized that the changes in the open securities mar-
ket, and their relation to fraud under Rule lOb-5, mandated the
adoption of the FMT. Open market purchasers need protection
from any fraud which causes injury, even absent direct reliance on
the actual misrepresentation or omission. 83 Section 10(b) and Rule
80 Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 989-90. Blackmun,J., refers to traditional bargaining transac-
tions as an example of the subject matter of early fraud cases. Id. at 990 n.21. A "face to
face transaction" is the opposite of the open market transaction. See Fischel, Finance
Theory, supra note 48, at 10. See also Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, supra note 20, at 912
("The critical difference between face-to-face transactions and transactions involving ac-
tively-traded securities, in sum, is the presence or absence of reliable market prices re-
flecting information possessed by diverse sets of traders.").
81 88 F.R.D. 134 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
82 Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 990 (quoting LTV Securities, 88 F.R.D. at 143). The court in
LTV Securities, continued, "if the investor did not rely on such agent, there has been no
reliance." Id. Thus, the defendant may rebut the reliance presumption by showing that
the plaintiff did not rely on the market price.
83 See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975). The dissent in Basic
predicted that the plurality's recognition of FMT "would effectively convert Rule 1Ob-5
into 'a scheme of investor's insurance.'" 108 S. Ct. at 994 (1988) (White, J., dissenting)
(quoting Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 469 n.5 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1102 (1983)) (the dissent in Shores made the same criticism, 647 F.2d at 475 (Randall, J.,
dissenting)). The dissent's primary contention was that because "rebuttal is virtually
impossible in all but the most extraordinary case[,]" Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 996 n.7, the
FMT protects undeserving investors. One noted commentator agrees that the presump-
tion is nonrebuttable. See Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, supra note 20; Fischel, Finance
Theory, supra note 48, at 11. Fischel does not, however, believe that FMT creates a
scheme of investor's insurance. He states:
Nevertheless, it does not follow that an effectively nonrebuttable pre-
sumption of reliance creates investor insurance. Investors' ability to
claim that they relied on the integrity of the market price helps to obtain
class certification but in no way establishes the merits of the underlying
claim. Plaintiffs must still establish that the alleged disclosure defect arti-
ficially inflated the market price and, if so, by how much. Given the multi-
ple alternative sources of information and the sophistication of market
professionals, this task will frequently be difficult even if plaintiffs can
establish that less than a model disclosure was made. Thus the fraud on
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1Ob-5 "foster an expectation that securities markets are free from
fraud" on which purchasers in a developed market should be able to
rely.8 4 Courts invoke the FMT to place "the element of reliance...
where ... it realistically belongs-connecting the purchaser to the
market, not the specific misstatement."8 5
Modem finance and efficient market scholars, however, high-
light the importance of limiting application of the FMT to actions
alleging fraud in efficient markets.8 6 Because the FMT presumes re-
liance on the market price, the underlying assumption of the theory
is "that the market price reflects all publicly available information
quickly and without bias." T87 This phenomenon occurs only in open,
impersonal, and efficient markets.88 As Justice Blackmun's reason-
ing in Basic shows, the Supreme Court understood that the FMT
should apply only to efficient markets.
In an efficient market, a security's price responds to new infor-
mation as quickly as the trading exchange can receive and process
it.8 9 This efficient market feature justifies reliance on the security's
price as an accurate indication of value.90 Under the efficient market
hypothesis, "all publicly available information is presumed to be re-
flected in securities' prices. This includes information in the stock
price series as well as information in the firm's accounting reports,
the reports of competing firms, announced information relating to
the state of the economy, and any other publicly available, informa-
the market theory in no way creates an investor insurance scheme when
all of the theory's implications are considered.
Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, supra note 20, at 919. Fischel also refutes the dissent's
other major criticisms, namely that the FMT is logically inconsistent and that the FMT is
judicial legislation inconsistent with congressional intent. See id. at 920-22. For other
responses to criticisms of the FMT, see generally Black, supra note 1, at 457-68; Fischel,
Finance Theory, supra note 48, at 13-17.
84 Blackie, 524 F.2d at 907.
85 LTV Securities, 88 F.R.D. at 144.
86 See generally Fischel, Finance Theory, supra note 48; Dennis, Materiality and the Effi-
cient Capital Market Model: A Recipe for the Total Mix, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 373 (1984).
87 Fischel, Finance Theory, supra note 48, at 9. See supra notes 58-61 and accompany-
ing text.
88 Fischel, Finance Theory, supra note 48, at 10. In support of this conclusion, Fischel
cites LTV Securities. The court there noted:
Recent economic studies tend to buttress empirically the central assump-
tion of the fraud-on-the-market theory-that the market price reflects all
representations concerning the stock. Indeed, economists have now
amassed sufficient empirical data to justify a present belief that widely-
followed securities of larger corporations are "efficiently" priced: the
market price of stocks reflects all available public information-and
hence necessarily any material misrepresentation as well.
88 F.R.D. at 144. The studies which both Fischel and the court refer to are cited supra
note 48.
89 R. HAUGEN, supra note 51, at 476; see supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
90 See infra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
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tion relevant to the valuation of the firm." 9 1
Professor Fische 92 concludes that courts should continue to
adopt the market model of investment decision 93 in their application
of the FMT.94 This Note supports this proposition. The market
model derives from the notion of efficient capital markets. 95 The
SEC, through its adoption of an integrated disclosure system, has
likewise accepted the efficient market model.96 The SEC uses the
91 R. HAUGEN, supra note 51, at 469 (emphasis in original). The efficient market
hypothesis takes three forms: the weak form, the semistrong form, and the strong form.
This Note depicts the semistrong form. Under each form, different types of information
are reflected in securities prices. Id. at 468-70. "Under the weak form... stock prices
are assumed to reflect any information that may be contained in the past history of the stock
itself." Id. at 468-69 (emphasis in original). Seasonal stock price patterns exemplify
information that a weak form efficient market would reflect. Id. As indicated in the
accompanying text, in "the semistrong form . . . all publicly available information is pre-
sumed to be reflected in securities prices." Id. at 469 (emphasis in original). Because
inside information is not public, investors who obtain inside information may profit in
the semistrong efficient market by trading on it. Under the strong form, "all information
is reflected in stock prices. This includes private, or inside, information as well as that
which is publicly available." Id. (emphasis in original).
The Supreme Court in Basic did not explicitly endorse any form of the efficient
market hypothesis. This Note does not attempt to formulate a conclusion in this regard,
but assumes that the Court adopted the semistrong version. The Court's definition of
the FMT supports this assumption by referring to "available material information." See
supra text accompanying note 77. Fischel also concludes that the FMT adopts the semis-
trong version of the efficient market hypothesis. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, supra
note 20, at 911. See generally Fama, Efficient Capital Markets, supra note 58, at 383 (Fama
was the first to outline the three forms).
92 Daniel R. Fischel is Professor of Law and Business at the University of Chicago
and is a noted commentator on the FMT.
93 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 990 (1988).
94 Fischel, Finance Theory, supra note 48, at 9. Fischel carries this contention to an
extreme. He maintains that the FMT, when applied in securities actions, obviates the
need for separate inquiry into materiality (of the misrepresentation or omission), reli-
ance, and damages. Id. at 12-13. This may be true on a theoretical level, as a nonmate-
rial disclosure or omission will not, under the efficient market model, affect the
securities price. On a practical level, however, inquiry into materiality makes the FMT
easier to understand and apply. The Supreme Court in Basic discussed at length the
requirement of materiality and stressed its practical importance. See Basic, 108 S. Ct. at
983-88.
95 Fischel, Finance Theory, supra note 48, at 10.
96 See Black, supra note 1, at 468-72. Professor Black analyzes the SEC's recognition
of the efficient market model: ("[T]he integrated disclosure system prescribes prospec-
tus disclosure requirements for securities offerings," id. at 468 n.216, based on the de-
gree to which "information about a corporation is sufficiently widely disseminated .. "
Id. at 468. Therefore, the amount of disclosure required is a function of the efficiency of
the market. See generally Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 33-6383, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380 (1982); Proposal of Comprehensive Revision to
System for Registration, Securities Act Release No. 33-6331, 46 Fed. Reg. 41,902
(1981); Proposed Comprehensive Revision to System for Registration, Securities Act
Release No. 32-6235, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,693 (1980); Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti Corp., 817
F.2d 356, 361 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1220 (1988); Pickholz & Horahan,
The SEC's Version of the Efficient Market Theory and Its Impact on Securities Law Liabilities, 39
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943 (1982).
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model to determine specific prospectus requirements. 97 Given the
acceptance of the efficient market hypothesis, courts should apply
the FMT only where the plaintiff traded the subject securities in an
impersonal efficient market.98
C. Basic and the Scope of the FMT
Rule lOb-5 provides three routes to recovery.99 Plaintiffs may
recover under Routes A and C if a defendant has perpetrated a per-
vasive fraudulent scheme. 100 Plaintiffs may recover under Route B if
defendants have made particular misrepresentations or omis-
sions. 10 1 Courts disagree over whether to apply the FMT to Route
B claims, particularly when the plaintiff admits that he never read
the allegedly fraudulent document. 10 2 Basic implicitly resolves this
97 Black, supra note 1, at 469, observes that "[t]he SEC's creation of a 'top tier' of
issuers that need disseminate only a bare-bones prospectus .. . is based on the efficient-
market thesis. In incorporating this theory, the SEC assumes that, in the case of the
most widely traded securities, information on the issuer is widely available, there is some
assurance that it is accurate, and therefore it need not be directly supplied to the inves-
tor." (citations omitted).
98 See Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 992. The Supreme Court adopted the findings of an im-
personal, efficient market as "threshold facts" from the court of appeals below. See Fin-
kel, 817 F.2d at 360; Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1161 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub
nom. Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti Corp, 108 S. Ct. 1220 (1988); Lipton v. Documation,
Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 745 (11th Cir. 1984) ("Fraud on the market theory finds its greatest
justification when applied to class actions alleging fraudulent misrepresentations or
omissions that affected security prices on a developed open market"), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1132 (1985); T.J. Raney & Sons v. Fort Cobb, Okla. Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d
1330, 1332 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Linde, Thompson, Fairchild, Long-
sworthy, Kohn & VanDyke v. T.J. Raney & Sons, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984).
99 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
100 See Smith v. Ayres, 845 F.2d 1360, 1363 (5th Cir. 1988); Peil, 806 F.2d at 1162.
The language of the Rule itself mandates this conclusion.
101 See Smith, 845 F.2d at 1363; Peil, 806 F.2d at 1162.
102 In the following cases, courts concluded that the FMT does not apply to Route B
claims: Smith, 845 F.2d at 1363; Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti Corp., 817 F.2d 356, 362 (5th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1220 (1988); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 471 (5th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983); Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640
F.2d 534, 548 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd in part,, 459 U.S. 375 (1983); Mattoros v. Abrams,
524 F. Supp. 254, 258 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
Most of the cases cited above originated in the fifth and eleventh circuits. Following
the 1981 division of the fifth circuit into the fifth and eleventh circuits, the newly-formed
eleventh circuit, in Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981),
adopted decisions of the former fifth circuit rendered prior to October 1, 1981 as prece-
dent. The fifth circuit decided Shores in May of 1981, five months before Bonner.
The following decisions expressly held that the FMT applies to Route B, and that
the plaintiff need not prove a common scheme of fraudulent activity: Pel, 806 F.2d at
1163; Rosenberg v. Digilog Inc., 648 F. Supp. 40, 43 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
The third circuit also noted in Pe that Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976), the "seminal fraud on the market case, ap-
pear[ed] to have involved a [Route B] claim," in that there the court "did not require a
schere in order to invoke the fraud on the market theory." Peil, 806 F.2d at 1163 n.16.
See also Digilog, 648 F. Supp. at 43 ("Blackie did not require proof of a common
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controversy. Three arguments exist which support this proposition.
First, the Court acknowledged only Route B of Rule lOb-5
when it quoted the Rule in its opinion.'03 Thus, the Court appar-
ently considered the claim a Route B claim, to which it the applied
the FMT.
Second, the claimed violation in Basic consisted of three partic-
ular fraudulent public statements.' 0 4 Thus, the very acts of which
the plaintiff complained fit Route B language. The case involved
specific misrepresentations, not an accumulation of individual steps
in furtherance of a pervasively fraudulent scheme. Blackie v. Bar-
rack 105 involved similar facts. Blackie, the "seminal case"' 1 6 with re-
gard to the FMT, involved a Route B claim. 10 7
Third, the Court relied heavily 08 on Peil v. Speiser,'0 9 in which
the third circuit held that the FMT sufficiently proved causation
when the plaintiffs could not show actual reliance on an inaccurate
prospectus. The court in Pei reasoned that a single misrepresenta-
tion may affect the price of a security traded in an efficient market" 0
and defraud those who rely on the price in their own trading."'
Thus, under the efficient market hypothesis, no reason exists for ex-
cluding Route B claims from the benefits of the FMT. 12 Public in-
formation, whether grounded in a single misrepresentation or a
fraudulent scheme, will influence a security's price."13
Lastly, the Peil court added that "[i]mposing such a requirement
(a scheme) creates another burden which could effectively preclude
scheme."); Note, FMT, supra note 1, at 1148 n.25 ("[t]he Blackie reasoning makes a
fraud-on-the-market theory available in a [Route B] claim as well as in claims based on
[Routes A & C]").
103 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 983, n.6 (1988).
104 Id. at 981 n.4.
105 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
106 Ross v. Bank South, N.A., 837 F.2d 980, 992 (11th Cir.), reh'g granted, 848 F.2d
1132 (1 lth Cir. 1988); See also Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti Corp., 817 F.2d 356, 361 (5th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1220 (1988) (describing Blackie as the "premiere fraud
on the market case").
107 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
108 See Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 989, 990, 991 n.25.
109 806 F.2d 1154 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom. Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti
Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1220 (1988).
110 Id. at 1163; see supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
111 Id. at 1162. Regardless of whether a plaintiff alleges a scheme to defraud or a
single fraudulent act, he must prove that the misrepresentation is material. Id. See Basic,
108 S. Ct. at 982-88, for discussion and analysis of the materiality requirement. Material
misrepresentations or omissions are likely to influence the behavior of reasonable inves-
tors. Peil, 806 F.2d at 1162; Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 983 (citing TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc.,
426 U.S. 438 (1976)).
112 Peil, 806 F.2d at 1162. The court stated that "fn]either the district court nor
defendants have explained why [Route B] claims should be exempt from the 'fraud on
the market' theory." Id.
113 See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
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the maintenance of otherwise legitimate suits under the securities
laws. Securities legislation, enacted for the purposes of avoiding
fraud, is intended by Congress to be construed... flexibly to effec-
tuate its remedial purposes."1 14 Given that.a single misrepresenta-
tion will affect a security's price, no argument supports preventing
Route B claimants from invoking the FMT in efficient market
settings.
To conclude that Basic extends the FMT to all Rule lOb-5
claims has significant ramifications for a defendant's ability to rebut
the reliance presumption. "Any showing that severs the link be-
tween the alleged misrepresentation and either the price received
(or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market
price, will be sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance."" 15
The defendant may rebut by proving that the misrepresentation was
not material and consequently did not affect the market price, 116
that the plaintiff would have purchased the stock regardless of the
misrepresentation, 1 7 or that the individual plaintiff purchased with
knowledge of the fraud. 1 8 The defendant may no longer rebut the
presumption by establishing that the plaintiff "did not rely directly on
[the] defendant's misrepresentation[; this] fact is not relevant under
the fraud on the market approach." ' 1 9 According to Peil, even if the
plaintiff admits that he never read the fraudulent document, the
court may invoke the FMT. 120 In stark contrast, Shores v. Sklar held
114 Peil, 806 F.2d at 1162 (quoting Rosenberg v. Digilog Inc., 648 F. Supp. 40, 43
(E.D. Pa. 1985) (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151
(1972)).
115 Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 992.
116 Pei, 806 F.2d at 1163.
117 Id. See also Smith v. Ayres, 845 F.2d 1360, 1363 (5th Cir. 1988) (reliance pre-
sumption rebutted because plaintiff would have taken the same course of action even
with full disclosure).
118 Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816
(1976). The court in Blackie also held that the defendant could rebut by proving that
despite the materiality, "an insufficient number of traders relied to inflate the price." Id.
This conclusion is unsound. It is the material fraudulent act itself that inflates or de-
presses the security's price. Fischel, Finance Theory, supra note 48, at 11, states: "It is a
contradiction... for a statement to be material yet not affect enough traders to influ-
ence the market price. The meaning of materiality under the market model is that there
has been an effect on the market price."
119 Peil, 806 F.2d at 1163 (emphasis in original).
120 Id. This conclusion troubled the dissent in Basic. Justice White claimed that ap-
plication of the FMT in this context is "at odds with the federal policy favoring disclo-
sure." Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 997 (1988) (White, J., dissenting in part).
Quoting the dissent in Shores, Justice White continued:
[D]isclosure ... is crucial to the way in which the federal securities laws
function.... [T]he federal securities laws are intended to put investors
into a position from which they can help themselves by relying upon dis-
closures that others are obligated to make. This system is not furthered
by allowing monetary recovery to those who refuse to look out for them-
selves. If we say that a plaintiff may recover in some circumstances even
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that under a Route B claim, a plaintiff who admits he did not read
the fraudulent document may not take advantage of the reliance
presumption. 121
III
THE FMT AND SHORES V. SKLAR
A. The Shores Rationale
As discussed in Part I, the subject securities in Shores v. Sklar
were new bond issues traded on an inefficient market in Frisco City,
Alabama.' 22 "The Shores court was therefore faced with the difficult
task of applying a doctrine developed in one context, the open mar-
ket, to the not entirely analogous setting of newly issued securi-
ties."1 23 Because the court found a general scheme to defraud 24
through Route A conduct, 25 as opposed to a single misrepresenta-
tion or omission, the Shores court held that the plaintiff could invoke
the FMT. The court, however, limited the FMT's application to alle-
gations that the bonds "were not entitled to be marketed....
The court focused on the absolute marketability of the bonds, not
their price. Under Shores, therefore, a plaintiff must allege that "the
fraud caused the [b]onds to be offered for sale on the market. If
[the plaintiff] proves no more than that the bonds would have been
offered at a lower price or a higher rate .... he cannot recover."' 2 7
The court's application of the FMT indicates that it failed to
though he did not read and rely on the defendant's public disclosures,
then no one need pay attention to those disclosures and the method em-
ployed by Congress to achieve the objective of the 1934 Act is defeated.
Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 997-998 (quoting Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 483 (5th Cir. 1981)
(Randall, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983)).
This argument, however, "reflects a lack of understanding of the" operation of [effi-
cient] markets in transmitting information." Fischel, Finance Theory, supra note 48, at 13.
It assumes, in contradiction to "theoretical and empirical evidence," that investors "can
make better.., decisions by first carefully analyzing disclosures ...." Id. See supra notes
58-61 and accompanying text; see also In re LTV Securities Litigation, 88 F.R.D. 134, 145
(N.D. Tex. 1980) (describing how traditionally managed portfolios, scrutinized by man-
agers, fare no better than randomly selected portfolios).
Fischel concludes that because the typical investor cannot understand the disclosure
documents, "the rational course ... is simply to accept the market price as given."
Fischel, Finance Theory, supra note 48, at 13. This avoids imposing costs on investors
"with no corresponding benefit." Id. at 14.
121 Shores, 647 F.2d at 468.
122 See supra notes 48-61 and accompanying text.
123 Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 745 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1132 (1985).
124 Shores, 647 F.2d at 472 (the court found the existence of "fraud on a broader
scale").
125 See supra note 2 for a definition of "Route A."
126 Shores, 647 F.2d at 469.
127 Id. at 470.
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understand efficient markets. Although Shores involved an inefficient
market, the court appeared to rely on the efficient market model.
For example, the court stated:
This theory is not that he bought inferior bonds, but that the
[b]onds he bought were fraudulently marketed. The securities
laws allow an investor to rely on the integrity of the market to the
extent that the securities it offers to him for purchase are entitled
to be in the market place.1 28
The court continued:
Misrepresentation and omission cases under [Route B] which, as
we do, require reliance on the document making the misrepresen-
tation or omitting a material fact are inapposite to a case in which
the buyer relied on the integrity of the market to furnish securities
which were not the product of a fraudulent scheme.' 29
The court misconstrued the concepts of integrity and efficiency.
The court failed to realize that market integrity is the product of
market efficiency. By referring to integrity, the court meant that in-
vestors should be able to purchase securities without fear that the
securities appeared on the market by virtue of a fraudulent scheme.
Although this may be true, a market will have integrity, so far as
FMT is concerned, only when a security's value is reflected in its
price. This reflection is related to the efficiency of the market. An
efficient market is one that incorporates all publicly available infor-
mation into the price of a security.130 Because it misconstrued these
two concepts, the Shores court incorrectly applied the FMT in an
inefficient market.
Shores should not have applied the FMT in an inefficient market
because the theory presumes investor reliance. In an inefficient
market, a security's price may not indicate its true value as deter-
mined by market analysts and investors. An inefficient market can-
not accurately and quickly process the very information which is
essential in determining the security's value.' 3 ' For this reason, an
investor cannot reasonably rely on an inefficient market to accu-
rately reflect a security's fair price. 32
128 Id. at 471 (emphasis added).
129 Id. (emphasis added). The court cited Blackie v. Barrack for support. Because
Blackie relied upon an efficient market in formulating the FMT, see Blackie v. Barrack,
524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976) ("We decline to leave
such open market purchasers unprotected"), the Shores court mixed apples and oranges.
The Shores court also misstated the current state of the law regarding the availability
of the reliance presumption for Route B claims. Basic indicates that the presumption is
available for Route B claims. See supra notes 99-120 and accompanying text.
130 See supra notes 58-61.
131 See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
132 This conclusion follows because in the inefficient market, analysts do not closely
follow or heavily trade the subject securities. The market does not necessarily incorpo-
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B. Circuit Court Confusion
The Shores opinion has created considerable confusion regard-
ing the scope of the FMT.133 Ross v. Bank South, N.A.,134 a recent
eleventh circuit1 35 opinion, illustrates an attempt to grapple with
Shores. Ross involved a new issuance of bonds which the defendant
used to finance a residential/medical facility for the elderly located
in Vestavia Hills, Alabama.1 36 As in Shores, the city established a
special board to issue the bonds.13 7 After repeated failures to ob-
tain an underwriter due to the calculated infeasibility of the project,
defendants successfully secured Herreth, Orr & Jones to underwrite
the issue. 138
rate fraudulent information in the security's price. See Black, supra note 1, at 453; see also
supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text; Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 992
n.27 (1988) (reasonable reliance is an element of a Rule lob-5 claim); Ross v. Bank
South, N.A., 837 F.2d 980, 995 (11th Cir.), reh'g granted, 848 F.2d 1132 (11th Cir. 1988)
(defendant can rebut the reliance presumption by showing that plaintiff's reliance was
not reasonable).
133 Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 745 (11th Cir. 1984) cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1132 (1985), provides an excellent example. After acknowledging that confusion
exists, id. at 745 n.7, the court attempts to clarify its discussion by concentrating on the
facts of Shores: "The Shores holding was thus necessarily confined to the limited setting
of newly issued securities traded on an undeveloped market and did not determine whether
the fraud on the market theory should apply to the open market context. It is that ques-
tion which is now before this court." Id. at 745 (emphasis added). This language im-
plies that Shores envisions a narrow FMT. Yet, the court later stated: "We thus read
Shores as implicitly approving of the general fraud on the market theory, although limit-
ing its application where new securities are involved to situations where but for the fraud
the securities would not have been marketable." Id. at 747. Because the second quota-
tion does not limit Shores to new securities, the statements are inconsistent.
Furthermore, compare Kirkpatrick v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d 718, 722, reh'g
denied, 832 F.2d 1267, (11 th Cir. 1987) (interpreting Lipton as reading Shores narrowly)
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1221 (1988) and Kennedy v. Nicastro, 517 F. Supp. 1157, 1159
(N.D. Ill. 1981) (stating that the Shores court accepted only a limited version of FMT
restricting its use in Rule 1Ob-5 actions to cases in which a seller could not have offered
the bonds for sale but for the fraud) with TJ. Raney & Sons v. Fort Cobb, Okla. Irriga-
tion Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330, 1332 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Linde,
Thompson, Fairchild, Longsworthy, Kohn & VanDyke v. T.J. Raney & Sons, 465 U.S.
1026 (1984) (holding that Shores extends Rule lOb-5 protection to newly issued securi-
ties).
Commentators also disagree regarding Shores. See, e.g., Black, supra note 1, at 452
(Shores represents a distinct form of fraud-on-the-market theory); Brunelle, The Shores
Case-Expansion of the "Fraud-on-the-Market" Doctrine, 9 SEC. REG. L.J. 390, 393 (1982)
(Shores represents an advance beyond the "mainstream fraud-on-the-market cases");
Rapp, supra note 1, at 883 ("Shores extends Blackie and its fraud-on-the-market theory
well beyond the parameters of its prior application"); Note, FMT, supra note 1, at 1152
(Shores adopted restricted view of fraud-on-the-market theory).
134 837 F.2d 980 (11th Cir.), reh'g granted, 848 F.2d 1132 (11th Cir. 1988).
135 Recall that Shores, a fifth circuit case, is binding precedent in the eleventh circuit.
See supra note 102.
136 Ross, 837 F.2d at 987.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 988.
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Plaintiffs purchased bonds in 1981 and, after the issue went into
default in 1984, sued alleging violations of section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5.' 3 9 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the defendants on all claims. 140 The court of appeals reversed, stat-
ing that the defendants had failed to rebut the reliance
presumption.' 4 '
The court of appeals recognized two distinct fraud-on-the-mar-
ket scenarios. The first involves the traditional open market Blackie
v. Barrack fact pattern and rationale. 142 "The second (and far less
common) type of fraud-on-the-market cases involves fraud in the is-
suance of securities traded on an undeveloped (primary) market."' 143
The court cited Shores as the leading case for this latter type of
fraud.' 44
Though the court properly distinguished Shores from true
fraud-on-the-market cases, its ultimate decision was unsound.' 45
Relying "'on the bonds' availability on the market as an indication
of their apparent genuineness,' "146 the court assumed that the mar-
ket is a good indicator of value and that it reflects available informa-
tion-essentially that the market is efficient.' 47 Because the court
conceded, however, that the market in Ross was inefficient, 48 the
139 Id. at 989. The fraudulent conduct consisted of an alleged scheme by the de-
fendants which involved sham transactions. The defendants allegedly pre-sold units in
the facility to salespeople, friends, and relatives (who had no intention of actually buying
the units), in order to enhance the attractiveness of the units to outsiders. Likewise, as
defendants "sold" more and more units, the facility became more attractive to bond
investors. Id.
140 Id. at 990.
141 Id. at 1004. Although the court of appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal
of the facility's trustees as defendants, that portion of the opinion is inconsequential to
this analysis.
142 Id. at 992. The court stated:
The first type involves a claim by a plaintiff who purchases a security
traded on a developed and open market .... Whether or not the plaintiff
in such a case relied on a specific misrepresentation or omission, she may
be entitled to relief because she relied "generally on the supposition that
the market price is validly set and that no unsuspected manipulation has
artificially inflated the price, and thus indirectly on the truth of the repre-
sentations underlying the stock price...."
Id. (quoting Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
816 (1976)).
143 Id. at 993 (emphasis in original).
144 Id.
145 The Ross court's reasoning parallels that in Shores. See supra notes 128-29 and
accompanying text.
146 Ross, 837 F.2d at 995 (quoting Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 470 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983)).
147 See supra notes 48-60 and 87-91 and accompanying text. Simply stated, "This
presumption of reliance derives from the concept of an efficient market ... ." McNich-
ols v. Loeb Rhoades & Co., 97 F.R.D. 331, 337 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
148 Ross, 837 F.2d at 993. The court stated that Shores is the leading case in which a
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court applied the FMT outside its proper domain.
This new, undeveloped market version of the FMT, created in
Shores and endorsed in Ross, presents a troublesome issue. While
the undeveloped market version is limited to the absolute marketa-
bility of bonds, 149 it creates a presumption of reliance that is even
harder to rebut than in the typical fraud-on-the-market case. 150 One
commentator states that Shores, as interpreted by other courts, con-
verts "fraud on the market theory into a pure causation" recovery
scheme.' 5 ' The reliance mandate of Basic' 52 thus becomes strict
"but for" causation liability. 153
In this context, a reliance presumption based on the FMT effec-
tively eliminates the plaintiff's reliance requirement. This "is an un-
necessary and unjustified expansion of the fraud on the market
doctrine ... "-54 Reliance on inefficient market prices does not
justify the FMT presumption. Nothing supports the belief that the
price indicates the security's actual value. 155 Only applying the
FMT in efficient market settings preserves the reliance requirement
which Basic mandates. 156 "The fraud on the market theory can be
interpreted as defining whether an individual's reliance was reason-
able under the ultimate objective standard-whether investors as a
whole were fooled."' 157 In contrast to inefficient markets, material
misrepresentation or omissions in well developed markets will affect
the market price. Thus, proof of materiality satisfies, though indi-
court applied the FMT in an undeveloped market. The Ross court continued that the
case before it "require[d] our court to examine for the first time the nature of the reli-
ance requirement in a case brought under Shores." Id. at 994.
149 See Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 470 (5th Cir. 1981) (if the plaintiff proves only
that the price of the bonds would have been different, he cannot recover), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1102 (1983).
150 Ross, 837 F.2d at 995. The court stated:
The rebuttal of this presumption is more difficult under Shores than under
Blackie. In a Blackie type case, the defendant can show that his fraud had
no effect on the market price. This defense severs the causal link be-
tween the fraud and the plaintiff's loss. A Shores defendant can make no
such showing, however, because his fraud creates the bond itself. Without
the fraud, the plaintiff could not have purchased the bond.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
151 Black, supra note 1, at 453.
152 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 989 (1988).
153 See Ross, 837 F.2d at 994; Kirkpatrick v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d 718, 722
reh'g denied, 832 F.2d 1267 (11 th Cir. 1987) cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1221 (1988); T.J. Raney
& Sons v. Fort Cobb, Okla. Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330, 1333 (10th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied sub nom. Linde, Thompson, Fairchild, Longsworthy, Kohn & VanDyke v. T.J.
Raney & Sons, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984).
154 Ross, 837 F.2d at 1007 (Allgood, J., dissenting in part).
155 See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
156 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
157 Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, supra note 20, at 908.
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rectly, the plaintiff's burden of proof. 158
Ross opens Rule 10b-5 defendants to striking liability.' 59 The
court conceded that investors must "take the risk of default into ac-
count when making their purchases,"' 60 but did not acknowledge
that fraud is one such risk. Rather, the court concluded that even in
an undeveloped, inefficient market, investors only bear risks in the
"absence of fraud .... "161
This Note does not contend that courts should leave defrauded
investors without remedy. Rather, it argues that investors must
prove every element of their claim in order to recover under Rule
lOb-5. Because one cannot reasonably rely on pricing in an ineffi-
cient market, 162 courts should not give plaintiffs the benefit of a pre-
sumption of reliance in inefficient market settings. Therefore, in an
inefficient market setting the plaintiff should bear the burden of
proving direct reliance on the defendant's misrepresentations. 16
158 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 992 (1988). The Supreme Court stated:
"The Court of Appeals found that petitioners 'made public, material misrepresentations
and [respondents] sold Basic stock in an impersonal, efficient market. Thus the class ...
has established the threshold facts for proving their loss.'" Id. (quoting Levinson v.
Basic, Inc. 786 F.2d 741, 751 (6th Cir. 1986)).
The court in Peil v. Speiser succinctly set forth the plaintiff's burden: "[P]laintiffs
who purchase in an open and developed market need not prove direct reliance on de-
fendant misrepresentations, but can satisfy their burden of proof on the element of cau-
sation by showing that the defendants made material misrepresentations." 806 F.2d
1154, 1161 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom. Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti Corp., 108 S.
Ct. 1220 (1988).
159 The Ross court concluded that "[i]f this result resembles insurer liability, it is
only because the defendant's fraud affected the entire class of purchasers. Shores stands
for the simple proposition that fraud on a broader scale that permeates the very issuance
of the bonds gives rise to liability on a broader scale." Ross, 837 F.2d at 996.
160 Id. Investing in undeveloped markets is inherently risky. It is not surprising that
the bonds in Ross returned interest at a rate of 15.5% to 17% tax free. Id. at 989.
161 Id. at 996.
162 See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
163 Although one can argue that this rule would preclude class actions in inefficient
market settings, this is not necessarily the case. The eleventh circuit recently addressed
this issue in Kirkpatrick v.J.C. Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d 718, reh'gdenied, 832 F.2d 1267
(11th Cir. 1987) cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1221 (1988). The action centered on limited
partnership shares issued in an undeveloped market. Holding, as did Shores, that the
plaintiff in a Route B claim must prove direct reliance on the misleading information,
the court specifically held that "[iln view of the overwhelming number of common fac-
tual and legal issues . . . the mere presence of the factual issue of individual reliance
could not render the claims unsuitable for class treatment." Id. at 724. Extending Kirk-
patrick to all three Routes under Rule lOb-5 is simple and fully warranted. Of course,
the plaintiffs must find an adequate class representative. See Epstein v. American Re-
serve Corp., No. 79 C 4767 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file)
(class certification denied because proposed representative inadequate); Masri v. Wake-
field, 106 F.R.D. 322 (D. Colo. 1984) (class certification denied because representative
inadequate); Seiler v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 102 F.R.D. 880 (D.NJ. 1984) (class certifica-
tion denied in securities fraud suit because proposed representative inadequate); Mc-




NEW ISSUES AND THE EFFICIENT MARKET MODEL
Shores and Ross are " 'bad' law"' 164 because they misconstrue an
economic theory and apply it in an improper setting. The proper
domain of the FMT is the efficient market. As presented in Part II,
the Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson endorsed this conclusion.' 65 Basic
did not, however, decide whether a plaintiff may apply the FMT to
new issues offered in efficient markets. Courts should adopt this use
of the FMT to clarify its application. 166 Security prices in an effi-
cient market reflect publicly available information, 6 7 so the market
will incorporate fraudulent information in a new issue's offering
price. Courts should therefore limit the FMT to efficient markets,
but should not restrict its application within them.
A simple market test follows naturally from Basic.168 If the
fraud-on-the-market theory denied because class representative subject to unique de-
fense).
Furthermore, placing the burden of proving direct reliance on the plaintiff pre-
cludes an unwarranted scheme of investors' insurance. The dissents in Basic, Ross, and
Shores point out that it is particularly important, given an inefficient market, to look out
for oneself when making investment decisions. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 997 (White, J., dis-
senting in part) (quoting Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 483 (5th Cir. 1981) (Randall,J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983)); Ross, 837 F.2d at 1005 (AllgoodJ., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Shores, 647 F.2d at 483 (Randall, J., dis-
senting)). In the inefficient market context, mandating proof of direct reliance does
further the disclosure policies of the securities laws. See Ross, 837 F.2d at 1005 (Allgood,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Recall that this Note reaches the opposite
conclusion with regard to efficient markets. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
164 Ross, 837 F.2d at 1009 (FayJ., concurring).
165 See supra notes 77-91 and accompanying text.
166 The crux of this analysis is the market itself and not the security. Not only is this
test consistent with the efficient market hypothesis, but it simplifies the application of
the FMT. For an illustrative example, consider Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider & Co., 578
F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1978). In Vervaecke, the court refused to apply the FMT to a new issue
of Hospital Authority bonds. Id. at 714. Many courts and commentators have inter-
preted Vervaecke as standing for the proppsition that the FMT does not apply to new
issues, and thus have concluded that the decision opposes Shores. See Lipton v. Documa-
tion, Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 743 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985); T.J.
Raney & Sons v. Fort Cobb, Okla. Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330, 1333 (10th Cir.
1983), cert. denied sub nom. Linde, Thompson, Fairchild, Longsworthy, Kohn & VanDyke
v. T.J. Raney & Sons, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984); Note, FMT, supra note 1, at 1152. The
eighth circuit, however, was not willing to extend the reliance presumption from Affili-
ated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), from omissions to misrepresen-
tations. Vervaecke, 578 F.2d at 718. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
Because Vervaecke involved misrepresentations, the court dismissed the fraud-on-the-
market allegations.
Under the proposed market test, the Vervaecke plaintiff's fraud-on-the-market claim
would likewise fail, but for another reason. Had the court found that investors
purchased the Hospital Authority bonds in an inefficient market, it would then conclude
that the FMT did not apply. The court would not need to reach the issue of whether the
bonds were a new issue.
167 See supra notes 48-49 and 58-61 and accompanying text.
168 The test is simple conceptually; however, calculating whether or not a given mar-
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court defines a market as efficient, then the plaintiff should be able
to invoke the FMT. The type of security traded-whether an ex-
isting or new issue-is irrelevant.
Courts may easily apply this market test. Lubin v. Sybedon
Corp. '6 9 and Epstein v. American Reserve Corp. 170 present good exam-
ples. In Lubin, the defendants issued limited partnership interests in
a hotel project.' 71 Prudential-Bache Properties, one of the defend-
ants, marketed the limited partnerships nationally from January
through April 1985.172 After the defendants sought Chapter 11 sta-
tus, 173 plaintiff brought suit alleging, among other claims, violations
of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.174 Specifically, the plaintiff claimed
that the defendants issued three offering documents which con-
tained fraudulent misstatements. 175 The documents grossly over-
valued the project and induced plaintiff to invest.' 76
Plaintiff sought to invoke the FMT and, consequently, did not
plead direct reliance on the offering documents. 177 The court dis-
missed plaintiff's claim under Basic and Blackie v. Barrack.' 78 The
court recognized that the FMT does not apply to securities traded in
inefficient markets, 79 and concluded that Basic's reliance presump-
ket is efficient may be quite difficult. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text for
relevant criteria in determining whether a market is efficient. Professor Fischel ad-
dresses the problem as follows:
The most that can be said is that the more rapidly prices reflect publicly-
available information, the more sensible it is to apply the theory. Factors
which will be relevant in analyzing how rapidly prices reflect information
include whether the security is listed on a national exchange, whether it is
actively traded, and whether it is followed by analysts and other market
professionals. In addition, the speed of price adjustments to new infor-
mation can be tested directly by use of widely accepted statistical tech-
niques. Nevertheless, there will inevitably be some marginal cases where
the applicability of the fraud on the market theory is unclear.
Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, supra note 20, at 912 (footnote omitted).
169 688 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Cal. 1988).
170 No. 79 C 4767 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
171 Lubin, 688 F. Supp. at 1432.
172 Id.
173 Federal bankruptcy law provides for reorganization of bankrupt businesses. See
II U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1982).
174 Lubin, 688 F. Supp. at 1433.
175 Id. ("According to Lubin, neither the Hotel's renovation history nor its later cost
overruns were disclosed in the documents which were drafted to solicit investors for the
limited partnership. It is these omissions (and corresponding misstatements) which lie
at the heart of Lubin's complaint.").
176 Id.
177 Id. at 1447-48.
178 Id. at 1445-46.
179 Id. at 1445. Prudential-Bache Properties did nationally market the subject lim-
ited partnerships, but did not do so on a "free, efficient and national securities ex-
change." Id. Rather, Prudential-Bache privately placed the securities in the primary
market. Id. "[A]ccording to Prudential-Bache, the Confidential Private Placement Mem-
orandum prominently declared that the offering price was determined solely by the
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tion was inappropriate given these facts. 180 The court stated that "a
strict fraud-on-the-market reliance presumption does not apply
where, as here, securities have not been purchased on an imper-
sonal market."''
Likewise, in Epstein v. American Reserve Corp., 182 the court used
the market test approach. After the plaintiffs purchased securi-
ties, 183 they initiated a securities fraud suit alleging that the defend-
ant corporations induced them to buy at artificially high prices. The
plaintiffs claimed that the defendants' financial statements inflated
the securities' prices by failing to disclose that one of the primary
subsidiaries of the defendant corporation was insolvent. 184 The
court held that "a plaintiff may invoke the rebuttable presumption
of reliance afforded under a 'fraud-on-the-market' theory only if he
can allege and prove ... that the stock at issue was traded on an
General Partner, and did not necessarily reflect the value of the property." Id. at 1446.
These facts fully explain the court's conclusion that the FMT was inappropriate in the
given context. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 51-55
and accompanying text for discussion of primary and secondary markets; see R. HAUGEN,
supra note 51, at 22-23 for discussion of private placement.
180 Lubin, 688 F. Supp. at 1445. Investors seeking Rule lOb-5 recovery should take
note of the court's pleading lesson: plead direct reliance as an alternative to the FMT
reliance presumption.
181 Id. The court could have concisely ended its analysis, but instead it continued,
analyzing other possible fraud-on-the-market claims. A unique variation of the theory
which the court held inapplicable, see id. at 1446, is found in Arthur Young & Co. v.
United States Dist. Court, 549 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
Though Arthur Young involved new securities issues that were not traded on the open
market, the court there held that:
Just as the open market purchaser relies on the integrity of the market
and the price of the security traded ... to reflect the true value of securi-
ties in which he invests, so the purchaser of an original issue security
relies, at least indirectly, on the integrity of the regulatory process and
the truth of any representations made to the appropriate agencies and
the investors....
Id. at 695. The Lubin court distinguished Arthur Young because in the latter, the defend-
ant had filed registration statements and prospectuses with the SEC prior to sale of the
partnership interests, and had shown or sent standardized statements to every investor.
In Lubin, no such reliance on the regulatory process was conceivable as the limited part-
nerships were not registered with or approved by the SEC. Lubin, 688 F. Supp. at 1446.
Compliance with the regulatory scheme does not create efficient markets; rather, it
provides more valuable information for an efficient market to process. Thus, regulatory
compliance provides no basis for application of the FMT. See Black, supra note I, at 455.
Perhaps sensing their unsound analysis, the Lubin court refused to conclusively endorse
either Arthur Young or Shores, and refused to depart from the theory presented in Blackie
and Basic. Lubin, 688 F. Supp. at 1446. See supra notes 99-121 and accompanying text.
Concededly, the court's reluctance may have been based in part on the plaintiff's faulty
pleading.
182 No. 79 C 4767 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
183 The securities purchased were in the form of stock or debentures. Id. at 2.
184 Id. Plaintiffs also alleged that defendants took numerous actions to conceal the
insolvency.
FRA UD-ON- THE-MARKET THEORY
impersonal, well-developed, efficient market."' t8 5 The court relied
explicitly on Basic and concluded that the FMT was unavailable for
lack of an efficient market.' 86
"The link between the . . . efficient capital market[] and the
fraud on the market theory is clear."' 8 7 The prices of actively
traded new issues should reflect publicly available information, and
consequently "it is rational for ... investors to accept the market
price as given."' 18 8 Reliance on offering prices is reasonable, and
therefore plaintiffs complaining of fraudulently marketed new issues
should have the right to invoke the FMT. The focal point is the type
of market and not the type of security.
CONCLUSION
The simplicity of the market test is attractive. The different ap-
plications of the fraud-on-the-market theory have led to confusion
among the courts, confusion which requires swift and pragmatic res-
olution. Strict adherence to an efficient market test, as proposed,
would assure that courts will apply the FMT in its proper domain.
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, though lacking a completely thorough analysis,
provides the framework for this recommended guidance.
Zachary Shulman
185 Id. at 6.
186 Id. The court concluded that the over-the-counter market was not impersonal,
well-developed, or efficient, and thus it could not meet the requirements of Basic. Id. See
also In Re Data Access Systems, 103 F.R.D. 130, 138 (D.NJ. 1984)(trading on the over-
the-counter market may not constitute an "active and substantial" market necessary to
apply the FMT).
The court also denied class certification because the proposed class representative
was inadequate. Epstein, at 6; see also supra note 163 for cases in which courts denied class
certification because the class representative was inadequate.
187 Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, supra note 20, at 911.
188 Id.
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